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László Halpern and Charles Wyplosz  
 
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION AND REAL EXCHANGE RATES IN 
THE 2000s: THE BALASSA-SAMUELSON CONNECTION 
 
 
In a developing economy, one which is catching up with the income levels in the more economically 
advanced countries, productivity in the sectors producing tradeable goods will tend to rise faster than in 
those producing non-tradeables.  Since wage increases tend to be more or less the same in all sectors, 
inflation will be relatively higher in the non-tradeables sector, an effect that will be strengthened if 
demand in a growing economy is biased towards services.  The result is that relatively faster 
productivity growth in the tradeables sector will lead not only to an unavoidably higher inflation rate 
for non-tradeables but also to a real appreciation of the exchange rate.  This hypothesis, known as the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect, is tested against the experience of the transition economies since 1990 and is 
found to hold.  This is an ineluctable process for a developing economy, which has particularly 
important implications for those transition economies about to join the EU since it may create a serious 





Since they embarked on the construction of new 
political and economic systems, the transition economies 
have adopted very different exchange rate regimes.   
Some have chosen the hardest version of pegs, a currency 
board, while others have opted for flexibility, and many 
have changed course along the way.  There has also been 
great diversity in the extent to which they have chosen to 
liberalize the capital account, which is intimately related 
to the exchange rate regime. 
The era of diversity is likely to come to an end for a 
substantial number of them in the near future.  By the 
middle of the 2000s, several countries from central and 
eastern Europe will have joined the European Union, and 
the enlargement process is likely to continue.  Barring 
surprises, by the end of the decade, 10 or more of them 
will have completed the process.  EU membership 
imposes a number of obligations in this respect.  In the 
long run, they must become members of the monetary 
union.  Along the way, they must “converge”, which 
implies a substantial degree of exchange rate flexibility.  
Before getting there, they are expected to eliminate all 
restrictions on capital flows.  The not-too-distant future is 
therefore one of full capital mobility and the most 
extreme and irreversible form of exchange rate fixity. 
This evolution raises a number of critical questions.  
To start with, a generally held view is that the differences 
in the exchange rate regime reflect in part the varied 
political-economic equilibria that have emerged 
following the collapse of the Soviet bloc.
1  S u c h  
equilibria, once established, only change very slowly.   
Undoubtedly, EU membership will exert a powerful 
influence in this respect, but the experience with the 
earlier EU members suggests that it would be unrealistic 
to expect rapid changes. 
The conditions attached to EU membership, the 
acquis communautaire, have always been shaped to fit 
the particular characteristics of the existing members.  In 
many respects, the transition countries are fundamentally 
different from previous entrants to the EU.  For example, 
table 1, which refers to the per capita GDP of previous 
entrants at their date of entry and to similar 1998 figures 
for the transition countries, shows that the transition 
countries, with the exception of Slovenia, are 
considerably poorer than any of the previous new entrants 
to the Union.  This comparison barely scratches the 
surface, as it ignores the larger differences in terms of 
economic structure, the welfare state, gender gaps, the 
development of the banking and financial systems, etc.  
Importantly, the EU has become more cohesive as 
economic and financial integration has deepened.  Much 
of today’s acquis communautaire would have been 
impossible to agree upon 20 years ago, when diversity
                                                        
1  See, e.g. S. Fischer and R. Sahay, The Transition Economies After 
Ten Years, IMF Working Paper WP/00/30 (Washington, D.C.), February 
2000; and C. Wyplosz, “Macroeconomic lessons from ten years of 
transition”, in B. Pleskovic and J. Stiglitz (eds.), Annual World Bank 
Conference on Development Economics 1999 (Washington, D.C.), 2001. within the Union was wider than it is today, and yet much 
less than it will be when the transition economies have 
joined. 
An implication of the relative backwardness of the 
transition economies is that they are expected to catch up 
with the EU – indeed, this is a key economic objective.  
Faster growth and continuing structural changes are 
bound to affect the exchange rate.  In particular, the 
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis implies a continuous real 
appreciation.  Here again, previous new entrants to the 
EU faced a similar process but, as table 1 indicates, it is 
likely to have been significantly more moderate than 
what is in store for the transition economies. 
In this paper, the focus is on the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect, which is potentially important for the future 
exchange rate policies of the EU candidate countries.   
Countries which join the European Union will have to 
agree on an exchange rate regime within the EMS 
framework and, eventually, they will join the Economic 
and Monetary Union.  The presence of a sizeable 
Balassa-Samuelson effect will affect both the choice of 
the exchange rate path and their inflation performance 
once they are in the monetary union.  Those countries 
which currently peg their currencies may already be 
facing a situation where inflation is influenced by this 
effect.  As the candidate countries will have to meet the 
convergence targets of the EU, the presence of a sizeable 
Balassa-Samuelson effect is therefore potentially 
problematic.  For those countries which operate a flexible 
exchange regime, the evolution of the nominal exchange 
rate may become a key policy instrument for meeting the 
convergence criteria. 
The next section briefly looks at the restrictions that 
accession may impose on exchange rate policies.  Section 
3 presents the theoretical building blocks of the catch-up 
process and of the Balassa-Samuelson effect.  Section 4 
examines graphically whether these hypotheses are 
verified in the transition countries.  Having confirmed their 
likely presence, section 5 proceeds formally to estimate 
and measure them.  Section 6 draws some conclusions 
from the implications of the empirical findings. 
This paper tries to cover all the transition countries.  
However, data availability is a serious constraint.  It may 
seem that too much emphasis is put on the issue of EU 
accession, but the process involved offers a unique 
insight into how countries with different exchange rate 
regimes will converge towards monetary union and on 
the relationships between different exchange rate regimes 
and the catch-up process and the associated Balassa-
Samuelson effect.  Their experience is also instructive for 
countries for which EU membership is not at present on 
their agenda. 
2  The choice of an exchange rate regime in 
the 2000s 
(i) General  principles 
A number of countries from eastern Europe are 
likely to join the EU by 2004-2005.  It has not yet been 
fully decided what restrictions will apply to their 
exchange rate regimes, but a number of principles have 
already been put forward.  The whole situation is 
dominated by the fact that the end-point is known, 
namely, that they will eventually adopt the euro.
2  Two 
periods need to be distinguished: the first before joining 
the EU and the second before joining the monetary union. 
Logically, since the final destination is known, the 
discussion must proceed backwards in time.  The 
ECOFIN Council
3 has recently affirmed the principle of 
equal treatment of all member states.  Inter alia, this 
implies the application of the convergence criteria to new 
members.  According to the Treaty of the European 
Union, prior to joining the monetary union, a country 
must have achieved a high and sustainable degree of 
nominal convergence with the euro area.  This is to be 
assessed on the basis of the convergence criteria laid 
down in Article 121 and the Protocol on the Convergence 
Criteria.  In particular a candidate country must have 
remained in the ERM-2 for at least two years with its 
exchange rate within the prescribed fluctuation band, 
without significant tensions in its foreign exchange 
market, and without a change in the central parity of its 
currency against the euro as a result of an initiative by the 
non-euro state. 
Prior to joining ERM-2, countries are required by 
the treaty to “regard their exchange rate policies as a 
matter of common interest”.  This essentially means that 
competitive devaluations are ruled out but the choice of 
                                                        
2  In principle, a country can ask for an opt-out clause, as was offered 
to Denmark and the United Kingdom.  In practice, however, such a 
request is likely to be turned down and, anyway, there has been no 
suggestion that any of the current candidates are interested in this option. 
3 ECOFIN  Council,  ECOFIN Council Conclusions on Exchange 
Rate Strategies for Accession Countries (Brussels), 7 November 2000. 
TABLE 1
Per capita GDP (PPP-adjusted) in relation to the EU average, 
1991 and 1998 
(Per cent) 
  1991  1998 
Czech Republic  ...............................  60.2  55.4 
Hungary ...........................................  44.9  45.9 
Poland ..............................................  29.3  34.2 
Slovakia ...........................................  41.7  43.5 
Slovenia ...........................................  55.7  64.1 
Estonia .............................................  40.5  34.4 
  Year of accession to EU 
Greece .............................................  62.4 
Portugal ...........................................  60.8 
Spain ................................................  73.7 
Source:  World Bank; IMF. 
 
4  __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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exchange rate regime remains free.  However, the rules of 
accession to the monetary union imply that new member 
states will be expected to join the revised exchange rate 
mechanism ERM-2, which is summarized in box 1. There 
is no rule concerning the timing of entry into ERM-2 but 
that decision, and the choice of a central parity, requires 
agreement between the ECB and the country in question. 
(ii)  Historical overview of exchange rate 
arrangements 
The types of exchange rate regime adopted since the 
early 1990s by a number of central and east European 
countries and Russia are summarized in table 2.  It 
follows the IMF classification, which is based on official 
statements about exchange rate policies.  At the 
beginning of the 1990s, conventional pegs with or 
without drift (regimes 3 to 6) were the most common 
exchange rate regime.  The choice of this option was 
driven by the wish to use the exchange rate as the 
nominal anchor in the initial period of macroeconomic 
stabilization.  Since the mid-1990s, there has been a 
tendency to move towards exchange rate regimes that are 
either relatively flexible or very rigid.  The Czech 
Republic, Poland, Russia and the Slovak Republic have 
abandoned their crawling pegs or bands in favour of more 
or less managed floats.  Romania and Slovenia have 
retained floating regimes since the early years of 
transition, although in practice Slovenia limits exchange 
rate movements severely.  According to this 
classification, Hungary is the only country still 
maintaining a conventional crawling band.  In contrast, 
Bulgaria and the Baltic states operate hard pegs: currency 
boards in Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania, a conventional 
peg with a zero fluctuation band in Latvia.  While 
Bulgaria’s and Estonia’s currency boards are tied to the 
euro, Lithuania’s currency board is tied to the dollar and 
Latvia’s peg to the SDR. 
Interestingly, the two countries that still operate 
conventional peg regimes, Hungary and, de facto, 
Slovenia, also maintain restrictions on short-term capital 
flows.  According to the European Commission’s most 
recent Progress Reports, the Czech Republic and Poland, 
which recently adopted more flexible managed floats, are 
now about to remove their last remaining restrictions on 
short-term capital flows.  The countries with rigid pegs, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, have already 
completed, or almost completed, the liberalization of 
short-term capital flows.  That the accession states will 
enter the EU with practically full liberalization of capital 
movements makes the next enlargement markedly 
different from previous ones.  In the enlargement of the 
1980s, Spain and Portugal entered the EU with the 
possibility of retaining their restrictions on capital flows 
for a period that lasted more than 10 years. 
(iii)  The challenges of accession to the European 
Union 
The principles described in section 2(i) imply that 
most of the candidate countries will have to reverse the 
recent direction of their exchange rate policies.  In order 
to be admitted into the euro area, those which currently 
allow for a float will need to reduce the range of 
variability of their exchange rates; and those which have 
adopted hard pegs (currency boards or zero fluctuation 
bands, or narrow bands in the case of Hungary) will have 
to adopt some degree of flexibility. 
(a)  From flexibility to ERM-2 
Regarding the first group of countries, those that 
will have to give up the no-commitment floating regime, 
it might be argued that the regime change will be largely 
formal since the ERM-2 allows for wide fluctuation 
bands (±15 per cent).  There are, however, two reasons to 
doubt whether the change will be entirely benign.  First, 
these countries will most likely be required to remove all 
remaining capital account restrictions on entering the EU.  
The experience with conventional pegs and free capital 
movement is not encouraging.  From Latin America to 
Box 1
The exchange rate mechanism-2 
The arrangements for the new ERM-2 were set out by the Amsterdam Council Resolution of 16 June 1997 and the Agreement
between the ECB and the national central banks of non-euro area member states of 1 September 1998.  Central rates are to be set
and adjusted jointly by the ECB and the relevant non-euro area national central banks (NCBs).  Adjustments to central rates
should be timely to avoid misalignments.  The standard band of fluctuation is ±15 per cent around the central rate.  Intervention
at the limits is in principle automatic and unlimited and supported by very short-term financing.  However, the ECB and the
NCB concerned can suspend intervention if price stability is endangered.  Narrower bands can be declared as a unilateral
commitment by a non-euro area central bank or formally agreed at the request of a non-euro member state.  In the latter case, the
decision will be taken jointly by the ministers of the euro area member states, the ECB, and the minister and the NCB of the non-
euro area state. 
Thus, ERM-2 is compatible with a fairly broad range of exchange rate arrangements.  The ECOFIN Council (2000) only
excluded three regimes: any regime without a mutually agreed central rate to the euro, crawling pegs and pegs to currencies
other than the euro.  Entering the EU with a currency board arrangement tied to the euro is compatible with the ERM-2 in the
sense that it could be regarded as a unilateral commitment by the acceding member state, with no obligations for the ECB
beyond those implied by the regular rules of the system.  It is understood that the currency board must have been in operation for
a substantial period of time to prove the viability of its target exchange rate with the euro in order to be accepted by the ECB. Asia, and including the Czech Republic and Russia, and 
more recently Turkey, capital inflows have tended to 
surge only to be abruptly reversed.
4  While in some cases 
the reversals can be blamed on unsustainable 
macroeconomic policies, they have also occurred in 
countries with impeccable macroeconomic policy 
credentials.  Ex post, the reversals have been associated 
with microeconomic weaknesses, but it is fair to say that 
these shortcomings had long gone undetected, and most 
of them were only identified after the crises had erupted.  
It is also likely that, in spite of all the monitoring 
associated with the accession process, the new EU 
members will remain vulnerable in a number of ways 
specific to the transition process which, while known, 
may not be recognized ex ante as a potential source of 
severe financial instability. 
Second, the relative economic backwardness of the 
transition countries suggests that their equilibrium real 
exchange rates will be appreciating.  If this is absorbed 
through a nominal appreciation, the fluctuation margin 
could become much more uncomfortable than is 
                                                        
4  The literature on this issue, started by C. Diaz-Alejandro, “Good-
bye financial repression, hello financial crash”, Journal of Development 
Economics, Vol. 19, No. 1-2, 1985, pp. 1-24, has been growing fast.   
Useful references are B. Eichengreen, A. Rose and C. Wyplosz 
“Exchange market mayhem: the antecedents and aftermaths of 
speculative attacks,” Economic Policy, Vol. 21, 1995, pp. 249-312; A. 
Demirguç-Kunt and E. Detragiache, “The determinants of banking crises 
in developing and developed countries”, IMF Staff Papers,  Vol. 45, 
No. 1, March 1998, pp. 81-109; and C. Wyplosz, How Risky is Financial 
Liberalization in the Developing Countries?, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 
2724, March 2001. 
commonly assumed on the basis of the experience with 
ERM-1, which brought together a much more 
homogeneous group of countries.  If the real appreciation 
is absorbed through inflation, the risk is that the acceding 
countries will find it difficult to meet the convergence 
criteria.  A possibly aggravating factor in this case is that 
the markets might conclude that EMU membership will 
be delayed and that the high inflation rate calls for a 
depreciation, thus triggering an exchange rate crisis.  The 
optimistic view is that the magnitude of this effect is 
small enough to be contained within the large fluctuation 
bands of ERM-2.  A key purpose of this paper is to 
provide estimates of the effect in order to judge which 
outcome is the more likely. 
(b)  From quasi-EMU to ERM-2 (and EMU) 
Bulgaria and the Baltic countries now have a regime 
almost equivalent to full EMU membership.  Their 
central banks perform essentially mechanical tasks with 
no macroeconomic policy content.  Unless they are 
allowed to bypass the ERM-2 requirement, they will have 
to re-establish a degree of flexibility which they have 
rejected in the past, and seem content to have done so.  
Such a step could be a source of potentially serious 
difficulties. 
Even if it is assumed that the monetary authorities 
will not want to abandon the strong discipline that they 
have established in recent years, they will have to 
convince their political authorities and the financial 
markets that this is still their determination.  With a 
regime of high capital mobility, false steps will quickly 
TABLE 2
Exchange rate arrangements in eastern Europe, the Baltic states and the Russian Federation, 1990-2000 
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Bulgaria  .............................  3 8 8 8 8 8 8 2 2 2 2 
Czech  Republic  .................  3 3 3 3 3 3 6 7 7 7 7 
Hungary  ............................  3 3 3 3 3 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Poland  ...............................  3 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 8 
Romania  ...........................  3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Slovakia  ............................  3 3 3 3 3 3 6 6 7 7 7 
Slovenia  ............................  .. .. 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Estonia  ..............................  .. .. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Latvia  ................................  .. .. 8 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Lithuania  ...........................  .. .. 8 8 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Russian  Federation  ..........  .. .. 8 8 6 6 6 6 8 8 8 
Source:  J. von Hagen and Jizhong Zhou, “The choice of exchange rate regimes of transition economies”, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (Bonn), 
2001, mimeo. 
Note:  Exchange rate regime description: 
1   Dollarization: no separate legal tender; 
2  Currency board: currency fully backed by foreign exchange reserves; 
3  Conventional fixed pegs: peg to another currency or currency basket within a band of at most ±1 per cent;  
4  Horizontal bands: pegs with bands larger than ±1 per cent; 
5  Crawling pegs: pegs with central parity periodically adjusted in fixed amounts at a fixed, pre-announced rate or in response to changes in selected 
quantitative indicators; 
6  Crawling bands: crawling pegs combined with bands of more than ±1 per cent; 
7  Managed float with no pre-announced exchange rate path: active intervention without precommitment to a pre-announced target or path for the exchange rate; 
8  Independent float: market-determined exchange rate and monetary policy independent of exchange rate policy. 
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attract speculative pressure.  A necessary condition is that 
Maastricht-type independence be given to the central 
banks, but that may not be enough.
5  Vulnerabilities will 
have to be kept to a minimum. 
A likely resolution of the problem is for these 
countries to adopt unilaterally a tight version of the ERM, 
allowing for no fluctuation band, in effect retaining a 
currency board arrangement.  This is entirely possible 
within the framework of ERM-2.  An even tougher 
solution would be to unilaterally euroize, but this is 
considered to be a different arrangement from ERM-2 
and would therefore require the agreement of the ECB 
and the European Union. 
Even if such a solution were adopted, the 
combination of a hard peg and a Balassa-Samuelson 
effect would result in a higher inflation rate than in the 
euro area.  If this effect is strong, it is entirely possible 
that some of the convergence criteria would be missed 
(inflation, the nominal interest rate).  Here again, it is 
necessary to determine the order of magnitude of the 
effect.  A preliminary, partial indication is provided by 
the case of Estonia, a country that from June 1993 tied its 
currency to the deutsche mark and, therefore, since 1999 
to the euro.  Chart 1 compares the inflation rates in 
Estonia and the euro area since 1994.  Two facts stand 
out.  First, the disinflation process has been slow since 
1994, taking over four years to get the rate down from 
around 50 per cent to just under 10 per cent; this was 
partly because the kroon may have been initially 
                                                        
5  A particular difficulty is that, while Bulgaria’s and Estonia’s 
currency boards are tied to the euro, Lithuania’s is tied to the dollar and 
Latvia’s peg to the SDR.  The last two countries will have to shift to the 
euro, always a delicate transition. 
undervalued, and partly because many administered 
prices were only gradually liberalized.
6  Second, the 
inflation gap has increased since mid-2000.  This 
development partly reflects the rise in oil prices, which is 
also visible in the euro area inflation rate.  On average, 
inflation has been higher in Estonia by 5.6 percentage 
points over the period January 1997-February 2001, and 
by 2.1 percentage points from January 1999 to January 
2001.  This is a rough indication of how matters could 
develop. 
3  The implications of catch up 
The theoretical background used to analyse the real 
exchange rate appreciation inherent in the catch-up process 
is the Balassa-Samuelson effect.  This can be described as 
follows.  Trade integration implies that most of the 
productivity gains appear in the traded goods sector.  This 
is not entirely correct, of course, as non-traded goods and 
services enter as intermediate inputs in the production of 
traded goods and are therefore facing indirect competition.
7  
In addition, to the extent that many services – the bulk of 
non-traded goods – are superior goods, rising standards 
of living will be accompanied by increasing demand for 
them.  In this sector as well, there are bound to be some 
economies of scale and scope, although their magnitude 
should not be overestimated. 
There is, however, little doubt that productivity will 
rise faster in the traded than in the non-traded goods 
sector.  Since rising productivity usually translates into 
rising wages, relatively faster productivity growth in the 
traded goods sector means that wages in this sector will 
tend to outpace those in the non-traded goods sector.  The 
central assumption of the Balassa-Samuelson theory is 
that wage increases tend to be equalized across sectors.  
Two main reasons are advanced to justify this 
assumption.  First, in the labour market, it is expected that 
supply will shift towards the better-paid jobs and thus 
will exert pressure towards wage equalization, even 
though inter-sectoral labour mobility is limited (skills, 
geographical location).  Second, considerations of 
fairness or solidarity, possibly backed by trade union 
pressure, will act to limit large differences. 
The non-traded goods sector, facing smaller 
productivity increases than in the traded goods sector, 
however, cannot remain profitable if it accommodates 
such wage increases.  The solution is to raise prices faster 
for non-traded goods.  Thus, the supply-side’s reaction to 
the larger productivity increases in the traded goods 
sector is to generate a higher rate of price inflation in the 
non-traded sector. 
What about the demand side?  Rising productivity 
induces increases in income and wealth, hence rising 
consumption.  If the demand for both traded and non-
                                                        
6  The liberalization of administered prices is still not complete. 
7  The idea of the Balassa-Samuelson effect was initially developed 
to take into account technological progress that is biased towards the 
traded goods sector.  This paper focuses on a different interpretation more 
relevant to the transition countries, namely, that growth is largely driven 
by the catch-up process. 
CHART 1
Consumer price inflation in Estonia and the euro area,  
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Source:  Bank of Estonia, Bulletin (Tallinn); ECB, Monthly Bulletin (Frankfurt
am Main). 
 traded goods grows at the same rate, demand is neutral 
and the supply-side effect dominates in the sense that it 
does not skew inflation towards non-traded goods and 
services.  Only if demand growth were to be biased 
towards traded goods could the supply side effect be 
offset, partly or completely.  If, as is usually thought to be 
the case, demand is biased towards services, which 
constitute the bulk of non-traded goods, the demand side 
effect reinforces that on the supply side. 
The last step in the reasoning concerns the 
exchange rate.  The ratio of non-traded to traded goods 
prices is often taken as a measure of the real exchange 
rate.  In which case, the conclusion must be that faster 
productivity growth in the traded goods sector leads to a 
real appreciation. 
If a wider definition of the real exchange rate is 
used, based for example on the consumer price index, one 
more step is needed.  This starts with the observation that, 
for a small economy, the prices of traded goods are 
driven by world prices and the nominal exchange rate.  
Under the assumption that the nominal exchange rate is 
constant, the conclusion is that the change in the prices of 
traded goods is the same at home and abroad. 
Non-traded goods price inflation is equal to the rise 
in prices for traded goods plus a measure of asymmetric 
productivity growth; it is therefore higher in countries 
where productivity is rising more rapidly.  Catching-up 
countries, in this case the transition economies, are 
therefore expected to have higher rates of inflation in 
non-traded goods prices.  This conclusion applies to the 
consumer price index, an average of the prices of traded 
and non-traded goods.  The result is real appreciation of 
the exchange rate. 
If the exchange rate is not constant, the result still 
holds as domestic traded goods prices rise at the same 
rate as the foreign traded good prices plus  the rate of 
depreciation.  When computing the real exchange rate, 
this effect is automatically taken into account.
8 
In conclusion, it is important to note that the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect is an equilibrium phenomenon, 
not an undesirable transitory effect that ought to be 
counteracted through policy actions.  In fact policy is 
unable to check this process, at least without resorting to 
distortionary price controls.  The real appreciation 
reflects the natural evolution of the economy, which has 
to be translated into relative price changes.  It is also one 
channel through which standards of living – e.g. as 
proxied by wages – rise towards those in more advanced 
economies. 
                                                        
8 Let  π
T and π
N be traded goods price inflation at home, π
T* and π
N* 
abroad, and ε the rate of nominal exchange rate depreciation, so that π
T = 
ε  + π
T*.  Then the evolution of the real exchange rate is:  
ε - (α π
T + (1 - α) π
N) + (α π
T* +  (1 - α) π
N*) 
where α is the share of traded goods in consumption, assumed to be same 
at home and abroad for simplicity.  The real exchange rate changes as:  
 - (1- α) [(π
N -  π
T) – (π
N* - π
T*)].   
It appreciates when π
N -  π
T >  π
N* - π
T*.   
4  A first look at the evidence 
(i) Relative  wages 
Before turning to direct econometric estimates of 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect, it will be useful to first 
look at the basic statistics for each of the various steps in 
the above reasoning.  First, is the assumption that wages 
tend to be equalized across sectors or, at least, that their 
relative position remains constant.  Chart 2 shows relative 
gross wages in industry and the services sector in 12 
countries for the period 1992-1999, depending on data 
availability (note that the scale differs from one country 
to another).
9 
The two first rows provide evidence for the 
countries of central and eastern Europe as well as the 
three Baltic countries.  In view of the considerable 
structural changes that have been underway, the margin 
of variation is typically quite small, usually no more than 
15 per cent.  In addition, the ratios typically display no 
trend, and where there is one it is towards unity, i.e. 
towards full equalization.  The last row includes four CIS 
countries where the ratio has been changing more widely 
and not always towards unity.  This is not surprising 
given that the market mechanism is far from being well-
established in these countries.  The conclusion is that a 
key assumption of the Balassa-Samuelson mechanism, 
namely, stability in relative wages across sectors, tends to 
be confirmed in the transition economies where markets 
have been developed most. 
(ii) Relative  productivity 
The second assumption to be checked is whether 
productivity has been rising faster in the traded than in 
the non-traded goods sector.  There is no direct measure 
of these sectors but it is customary to consider that much 
of the industrial sector produces traded goods, while most 
services are non-traded.  In principle total factor 
productivity should be compared, but this requires 
estimation of production functions for each country 
which is impossible given the short time series available 
and the lack of capital stock data.  Instead, the general 
practice in the literature of measuring labour productivity, 
the ratio of output to employment, is followed. 
Chart 3 brings together the evidence for the six 
countries for which the data are available for enough 
years to produce meaningful graphs.  After some 
irregular behaviour in the early years of transition, 
productivity is definitely growing faster in industry than 
in the services sector.  The average annual difference 
from the trough to the last observation ranges from 4.6 
percentage points in Slovenia to 11.1 percentage points in 
the Czech Republic.  These are large numbers. 
                                                        
9  This procedure disregards differences in the structure of 
employment in different sectors.  It is obvious that skill, gender, seniority, 
firm size, ownership, location, etc. affect wage differences. 
8  __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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 (iii) Relative  prices 
Finally, as an approximation of the ratio of non-
traded to traded goods prices, the evolution of the price of 
services relative to the producer price index for industrial 
goods is examined.  Chart 4 presents the available 
information for 16 countries.  Occasional sudden declines 
in the price ratio are related to sharp devaluations, often 
following a period of overvaluation.  Over the whole 
period, however, a clear trend is discernible in all 
countries.  The chart suggests that it is indeed worth 
undertaking a formal test of the Balassa-Samuelson effect 
in the transition countries. 
6.5 Formal  evidence 
The visual examination of the data suggests that each 
step of the reasoning that leads to the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect is empirically verified.  The accumulated evidence is 
strong, but it remains largely circumstantial as a number of 
other factors are likely to interfere with the postulated 
mechanism.  For example, demand factors – including 
exchange rate changes – are likely to interfere with the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect.  This could come about as a 
structural effect either associated with the luxury good 
nature of many services, or with a drop in demand for 
domestic production relative to previously unavailable 
traded goods.  There could also be an adjustment effect if, 
through price moderation and possibly public subsidies, 
large manufacturing firms were able to overcome the drop in 
incomes and spending associated with the transition shock. 
The analysis proceeds in several steps, following the 
same logic as in the previous section: since the Balassa-
Samuelson effect rests on a number of mechanisms, the 
presence of each of them is checked before testing directly 
for the complete effect.  First the behaviour of labour 
productivity is investigated, in order to confirm that it is 
driven by supply-side factors.  Next, real product wages in 
industry and in services are related to productivity, gross and 
net wages being examined separately.  The following step 
examines what has been driving growth in industry and in 
the services sectors.  Importantly, these steps are not 
regarded as structural estimations, but simply as additional 
ways of exploring the statistical properties of the data and of 
detecting possible heterogeneity among countries in this 
process.  The steps from productivity to real product wages, 
to real consumer wages and to growth allow the Balassa-
Samuelson effect to be disentangled.  The effect of these 
factors on inflation has not been included as the necessary 
assumptions would have been rather heroic.  Finally, direct 
estimates of the Balassa-Samuelson effect are made, using 
the methodology developed by De Gregorio et al.,
10 which 
allows for demand factors as suggested by Bergstrand.
11 
                                                        
10  J. De Gregorio, A. Giovannini and H. Wolf, “International 
evidence on tradeables and nontradeables inflation”, European Economic 
Review, Vol. 38, No. 6, June 1994, pp. 1225-1244. 
11  J. Bergstrand, “Structural determinants of real exchange rates and 
national price levels: some empirical evidence”, The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 81, No. 1, 1991, pp. 327-334. 
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 Panel data are used for all the transition countries for the 
period 1991-1999.  However, due to many missing 
observations, the panel is unbalanced.  Each table shows 
which countries and years are included in the regression 
equations. 
(i) Sectoral  productivity 
Table 3 reports regressions of sectoral productivity 
(industry and services separately, in logs) on two 
explanatory variables: sectoral investment as a ratio to 
sectoral GDP, and total foreign direct investment as a ratio 
to total GDP.
12  It could be argued that foreign direct 
investment is subsumed in total investment.  However, if 
foreign direct investment is an important channel for 
transfers of technology, it should play an additional role.  An 
allowance is also made for slow adjustment by introducing 
lagged productivity.  The sample includes 10 or 11 
countries, depending on the sector under investigation.   
Various robustness checks (fixed and random effects, 
varying coefficients, different estimation methods, etc.) 
                                                        
12  It would have been preferable to use sectoral foreign direct 
investment, of course, but the data are not disaggregated by sector.  If 
spillover effects dominate sector-specific effects the approach here is 
appropriate but this may not be the case. 
were conducted and these confirmed the substance of the 
results wherever they were found to be meaningful. 
All the explanatory variables are significant at the 
conventional confidence levels and have the expected 
sign.  Only for the investment ratio in industry is the 
coefficient significant at more than the 1 per cent level.  It 
is worth noting that foreign direct investment adds to 
investment, and that this effect is significantly larger in 
the services sector.  More detailed analysis is required to 
determine where exactly this additional effect is 
strongest; it could be in the banking sector or in retail 
trade, two sectors where foreign investments are known 
to have been important in building up know-how.   
Unsurprisingly, productivity has been adjusting faster in 
industry than in the services sector. 
(ii)  Sectoral real product wages 
Critical to the Balassa-Samuelson effect is the link 
from labour productivity to wages.  Does it exist in the 
transition economies?  The relationship is explored in 
TABLE 3
Estimated regressions results for sectoral productivity 
(Dependent variable: productivity) 
Variables  Industry  Service 
Constant ................................................... 1.348217***  2.955725***
Productivity lagged ................................... 0.753621***  0.399006***
Total FDI/total GDP .................................. 0.024500***  0.066109***
Sectoral investment/sectoral GDP ........... 0.050157*  0.015964***
Sample ...................................................... 1991-1998  1992-1998 
Included observations ............................... 8  7 
Number of cross-sections used ................ 11  10 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations .... 60  55 
Adjusted R-squared .................................. 0.617728  0.483132 
Standard error of regression  .................... 0.109048  0.042949 
Mean of dependent variable ..................... 4.643807  4.608888 
Standard deviation of dependent variable ..... 0.176373 0.059740 
Estimation method .................................... GLSa GLSa 
Czech Republic  ........................................ 1992-1998  1992-1998 
Hungary .................................................... 1992-1998  1993-1998 
Poland ....................................................... 1993-1998  1993-1998 
Romania ................................................... 1991-1998  1992-1998 
Slovakia .................................................... 1996-1998  1994-1997 
Slovenia .................................................... 1994-1997  .. 
Estonia ...................................................... 1994-1997  1994-1997 
Latvia ........................................................ 1992-1998  1992-1998 
Lithuania ................................................... 1993-1998  1993-1998 
Kyrgyzstan ................................................ 1994-1998  1994-1998 
Russian Federation .................................. 1996-1998  1996-1998 
Source:  Basic data from UN/ECE Common Database. 
Note:  Variables are in logs (net capital inflow was always positive for the 
observations used for estimation).  Significance tests at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent 
level, respectively, are indicated by *, ** and ***. 
a Cross-section  weights. 
 
TABLE 4 
Estimated regressions results for sectoral real product wages 
(Dependent variable: gross sectoral wage  
deflated by producer price index) 
Variables  Industry  Service 
Constant ................................................... -1.532179***  .. 
Country effect  ..  .. 
Czech Republic  ..................................... ..  -0.063584 
Hungary ................................................. ..  -0.011136 
Poland .................................................... ..  -0.009449 
Slovakia ................................................. ..  0.025473 
Estonia ................................................... ..  0.059634 
Latvia ..................................................... ..  0.180058 
Lithuania ................................................ ..  0.031741 
Real product wage lagged ........................ 0.641248***  0.125584***
Productivity ............................................... 0.283233***  0.479235***
Employment .............................................. -0.301050***  3.273128***
Unemployment rate .................................. -0.023311***  .. 
Sample ..................................................... 1991-1999  1991-1998 
Included observations  .............................. 9  8 
Number of cross-sections used ................ 11  7 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations .... 68  42 
Adjusted R-squared .................................. 0.501623  0.892094 
Standard error of regression .................... 0.407117  0.184464 
Mean of dependent variable ..................... 0.244320  0.183151 
Standard deviation of dependent variable ..... 0.576688 0.561551 
Estimation method .................................... GLSa GLSa 
Czech Republic ........................................ 1991-1998  1991-1998 
Hungary .................................................... 1993-1998  1993-1998 
Poland ...................................................... 1993-1998  1993-1998 
Romania ................................................... 1993-1998  .. 
Slovakia .................................................... 1993-1998  1995-1998 
Slovenia .................................................... 1995-1998  .. 
Estonia ...................................................... 1994-1998  1994-1998 
Latvia ........................................................ 1992-1998  1993-1998 
Lithuania ................................................... 1992-1998  1993-1998 
Kyrgyzstan ................................................ 1992-1999  .. 
Russian Federation .................................. 1995-1998  .. 
Source and note:  As for table 3. 
a Cross-section  weights. 
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table 4 for a sample of eight or nine countries between 
1991 and 1999, with variations depending on data 
availability.  The dependent variable is the real gross 
product wage (in log form).  The impact of productivity on 
the real product wage is found to be highly significant.  
Interestingly, reflecting the gradual process of retooling 
in industry, the effect is slower and initially smaller in 
this sector than in the services sector.  In the long run, 
however, the impact is larger (the implied long-run 
coefficient being 0.79 in industry and 0.55 in the services 
sector). 
The estimation also allows for labour market 
characteristics to affect real product wages.   
Unemployment is found to hold down wages, but only in 
industry.  This surprising result in fact provides further 
support to the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, which sees 
wages in the services sector being driven not by labour 
market conditions in this sector but by a tendency 
towards equalization across sectors.  Actually, the 
attempt to find empirical support for this proposition 
failed. 
Sectoral employment has also been included as an 
explanatory variable.  Employment affects the real 
product wage negatively in industry, positively in the 
services sector, both effects being highly significant.   
This finding supports the view developed by Grafe and 
Wyplosz,
13 according to which, in the transition phase, 
productivity is driven by the sectoral reallocation of 
labour from industry to services.  Only when industry 
releases its inefficiently used labour force – or excess 
employment – inherited from central planning can the 
process of deep restructuring develop. 
(iii)  Sectoral real wages
14 
The wage equalization assumption really concerns 
net consumer wages, but unfortunately data on these do 
not exist for most transition countries.  Accordingly, the 
estimates that follow, which includes only four or six 
countries, should be considered as very tentative or merely 
illustrative.  A simple check is made for the transmission 
of real product wages and taxes (which create a wedge 
between gross and net wages) to net real wages. 
The results reported in table 5 confirm the presence 
of such a transmission channel.  All the coefficients have 
the correct sign and are significant at the conventional 
confidence levels, the effect from real product wages to 
real wages being weakest in industry. 
(iv) Sectoral  growth 
The last check on the data concerns the annual 
growth of output (GDP) in each sector.  The main 
purpose of this exercise is to determine the roles of 
demand and supply factors.  Recall that the Balassa-
Samuelson effect is presumed to originate in the supply 
                                                        
13  C. Grafe and C. Wyplosz, “The real exchange rate in transition 
economies”, in M. Blejer and M. Skreb (eds.), Balance of Payments, 
Exchange Rate and Competitiveness in Transition Economies (Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1999). 
14  Net wages in each sector deflated by the consumer price index. 
side of the economy but that, under plausible conditions, 
demand-side effects should not work against it.  At any 
rate, it is useful to evaluate the respective roles of these 
two channels. 
Table 6 reports the result of the estimated 
regressions of sectoral growth.  The supply side is 
captured via employment and productivity, lagged to 
reduce the problem of reverse causality.  Data availability 
allows the inclusion of eight countries in the (unbalanced) 
panel.  The presence of supply-side factors is strongly 
confirmed by the data, although employment is not found 
to affect growth significantly in the services sector.  A 
possible reason for this is that the services sector does not 
face a manpower constraint: it offers equally attractive 
wages as industry but is seen as providing more desirable 
occupations.  Another possibility is that the services 
sector is quite heterogeneous, with a larger share of 
unskilled workers who may have nowhere else to go. 
The other variables include demand-side factors, 
total domestic consumption and exports, both lagged.   
Consumption enters positively, as expected, and is highly 
significant.  Exports do not affect growth in the services 
sector, confirming the non-tradeable characteristics of 
this sector. 
(v)  The Balassa-Samuelson effect 
Having tested the presumptions concerning the 
different components of the Balassa-Samuelson 
hypothesis, its presence can now be tested directly.  The 
purpose is to determine whether the relative prices of 
non-traded to traded goods respond positively to different 
TABLE 5 
Estimated regressions results for sectoral real wage 
(Dependent variable: net sectoral wage  
deflated by consumer price index) 
Variables  Industry  Service 
Constant ................................................... 0.007912**  -0.029594***
Real wage lagged ..................................... 0.671040***  0.687206***
Real product wage increase ..................... 0.061037*  0.529754***
Tax (ratio of gross to net wages) increase .... -0.234936*** -0.310088***
Time .......................................................... 0.006196***  0.008691***
Sample ..................................................... 1993-1999  1993-1999 
Included observations  .............................. 7  7 
Number of cross-sections used ................ 6  4 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations .... 38  23 
Adjusted R-squared .................................. 0.449795  0.862067 
Standard error of regression .................... 0.126439  0.023095 
Mean of dependent variable ..................... 0.068505  0.026499 
Standard deviation of dependent variable ... 0.170459 0.062185 
Estimation method .................................... GLSa GLSa 
Hungary..................................................... 1993-1999 1993-1999 
Poland ...................................................... 1993-1998  1993-1998 
Romania ................................................... 1993-1999   
Slovenia .................................................... 1993-1999  1994-1998 
Latvia ........................................................ 1994-1999  1995-1999 
Lithuania.................................................... 1995-1999  
Source and note:  As for table 3. 
a Cross-section  weights. 
 secular trends in the two sectors, with a possible 
additional role for demand factors.
15 
As before, all the available data are used to build a 
panel of nine countries over the nine years 1991-1999.  
The relative price change is shown in chart 4, i.e. the ratio 
of the services price index to the non-food manufacturing 
producer price index.  Labour productivity is displayed in 
chart 3.  Following Bergstrand,
16 demand-side effects are 
captured by two variables, GDP per capita (PPP-
adjusted) and the change in the rate of inflation. 
The basic regression is reported in the first column 
of table 7.  Crucially, the two productivity coefficients are 
significant and have the correct sign, confirming the 
presence of the Balassa-Samuelson effect: productivity 
growth in industry leads to a real appreciation, 
productivity growth in services to a real depreciation.   
The former enters with a larger coefficient, as expected 
given that the services sector is usually more labour 
intensive than industry.  If productivity rises by 10 per 
                                                        
15  Following the formulation in J. De Gregorio et al., op. cit., 
pp.  1225-1244, the Balassa-Samuelson equation can be written as 
follows: 
log (PN/PT) = a0 + a1[αN/αT log(πT) – log (πN)] + demand factors, 
where PN/PT is the ratio of non-traded to traded goods prices, αN and αT 
are the shares of labour in, respectively, the non-traded and traded goods 
sectors, and πT and πN is productivity in each sector. 
16  J. Bergstrand, op. cit, pp. 327-334. 
cent in the industrial sector alone, the relative price of 
non-traded to traded goods increases by 2.4 per cent in 
the short run and by 4.4 per cent in the long run. 
GDP per capita also enters the equation 
significantly and positively, suggesting the possibility of 
a bias towards non-traded goods.  The inflation 
acceleration term differs from one country to another, as 
reported in table 7. 
This regression equation survived a variety of 
robustness checks.  Different estimation methods (fixed 
and random effects, OLS and GLS regressions) were 
tested; allowance was made for a potential bias in 
government spending; the possibility that the relationship 
may have changed over time was explored by allowing 
for additive and multiplicative dummy variables to 
TABLE 6
Estimated regressions results for sectoral output growth 
(Dependent variable: sectoral GDP at constant prices) 
Variables  Industry  Service 
Constant ................................................... -4.507638***  0.413191* 
Sectoral employment lagged .................... 0.511320***  .. 
Sectoral productivity lagged ..................... 0.459751***  0.723927***
Consumption lagged ................................. 0.783707***  0.182189***
Exports lagged .......................................... 0.227025***  .. 
Time .......................................................... ..  0.018402***
Sample ...................................................... 1992-1999  1992-1999 
Included observations ............................... 8  8 
Number of cross-sections used ................ 11  10 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations .... 62  58 
Adjusted R-squared .................................. 0.785472  0.324213 
Standard error of regression  .................... 0.091454  0.068647 
Mean of dependent variable ..................... 4.710958  4.628120 
Standard deviation of dependent variable ... 0.197452 0.083506 
Estimation method .................................... GLSa GLSa 
Czech Republic  ........................................ 1992-1999  1992-1999 
Hungary .................................................... 1993-1998  1993-1998 
Poland ....................................................... 1993-1998  1993-1998 
Romania ................................................... 1992-1999  1992-1999 
Slovakia .................................................... 1996-1998  .. 
Slovenia .................................................... 1994-1999  1994-1999 
Estonia ...................................................... 1996-1999  1996-1999 
Latvia ........................................................ 1997-1999  1997-1999 
Lithuania ................................................... 1992-1999  1992-1999 
Kyrgyzstan ................................................ 1993-1999  1994-1999 
Russian Federation .................................. 1996-1998  1996-1998 
Source and note:  As for table 3. 
a Cross-section  weights. 
 
TABLE 7 
Estimation results on service-to-consumer goods price ratio 










Constant ............................................. 2.060734*** 1.108583*** 2.451394***
Service-to-non-food price ratio lagged ...... 0.444020*** 0.446326*** 0.329490***
Productivity in industry ....................... 0.242327*** 0.174235*** 0.247501***
Exchange rate effect a .................... 0.007960*** 0.005915***
Productivity in services ...................... -0.184074*  0.128094*  -0.106654**
GDP/capita (PPP) .............................. 0.027596**  0.006321 
Inflation acceleration 
Country effect 
Czech Republic ........................... -0.001539**  -0.002185***
Hungary ....................................... 0.001177**  0.002089***
Poland ......................................... -0.003233**  -0.003756**
Romania ...................................... 0.000553  0.000522* 
Slovenia ....................................... 0.003063*** 0.003482***
Estonia ......................................... 0.001503**  0.001395**
Latvia ........................................... -0.004271*** -0.004174***
Lithuania ...................................... -0.000796**  -0.000586***
Russian Federation ..................... -0.006278**  -0.006452**
Sample ............................................... 1991-1998 
Included observations ........................ 8 
Number of cross-sections used ......... 9 
Total panel  
  (unbalanced) observations .............. 56 
Adjusted  R-squared  ........................... 0.954151 0.954108 0.442372 
Standard error of regression .............. 0.065048  0.065078  0.226850 
Means of dependent variable ............   4.567562   
Standard deviation  
  of dependent variable ............................   0.303785  
Estimation method .............................   GLSb   
Czech Republic ..................................   1994-1998   
Hungary .............................................   1992-1998   
Poland ................................................   1992-1998   
Romania .............................................   1991-1998   
Slovenia .............................................   1993-1998   
Estonia ...............................................   1993-1998   
Latvia .................................................   1992-1998   
Lithuania ............................................   1993-1998   
Russian Federation ............................   1995-1998   
Source and note:  As for table 6.1.1 and table 6.5.1, except that inflation 
acceleration is not in logs.  (The consumer goods prices refer to the consumer 
price index less food and less services.) 
a  Exchange rate regime without any formal commitment (managed or free 
float). 
b Cross-section  weights. 
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capture the number of years since the beginning of 
reforms (using the dating proposed by Fischer and 
Sahay).
17  Since productivity in industry, in some cases, 
declined in the early transformation period, a check was 
made to see if there were different coefficient values 
during these years.  None of these potential effects turned 
out to be significant, and none had any substantial effect 
on the results. 
The only variation that seems to matter is the 
exchange rate regime.  This possibility is suggested by the 
behaviour of relative prices as shown in chart 4.  Using the 
classification shown in table 2, three categories of 
exchange rate regime were established: hard pegs (regimes 
1 to 3 in table 2), exchange rate commitment (regimes 4 to 
6) and no explicit commitment (regimes 7 and 8).  The 
resulting dummy variables were used to test for an effect 
on the productivity coefficients.  Table 7 shows that the 
only exchange rate regime to make a difference is the no-
commitment one.  The second column indicates that the 
effect of productivity in the traded goods sector (industry) 
increases under this regime while it changes sign in the 
non-traded goods sector (services), being marginally 
significant.  In the third column, the effect of productivity 
in the non-traded goods sector is again found to be 
negative, as predicted by the Balassa-Samuelson 
assumption, while the role of productivity in the traded 
goods sector remains enhanced under the no-commitment 
exchange rate regime.  We conclude that a floating rate 
regime strengthens the Balassa-Samuelson effect.  This is 
not surprising: if the exchange rate is free to absorb some 
of the equilibrium real appreciation in the form of a 
nominal appreciation rather than forcing adjustment 
through absolute price changes, the effect is bound to 
appear faster, which makes a difference given the short 
time series.  Of course, with a longer data series, such 
nominal short-term rigidities should vanish.  The result 
therefore essentially confirms the robustness of the 
evidence regarding the Balassa-Samuelson effect.  In 
particular, the estimate of the all-important coefficient of 
productivity in industry remains unchanged. 
6.6 Policy  implications 
The likely continuing presence of a Balassa-
Samuelson effect is a serious complicating factor for the 
process of integration of the transition countries into 
ERM-2 and, eventually, EMU.  In t<his respect, the next 
accession round raises more serious challenges than 
previous ones. 
First, the economic distance for the new entrants to 
catch up is much larger than for any previous entrants to 
the European Union, as documented in table 1.  The 
scope for catch up of the largest transition country, 
Poland, is about twice that facing Greece or Portugal 
when they joined.  By 2004, they will have moved further 
ahead, of course.  Another message from the table, is that 
the 30 per cent average real appreciation (as measured by 
the ratio of non-traded to traded goods prices) between 
1995 and 1999 corresponds to only a minute closing of 
the initial gap.  Even if growth remains rapid until 2004, 
                                                        
17  S. Fischer, and R. Sahay, op. cit. 
the scope for catch up and real appreciation will still be 
considerably larger than was ever the case in previous 
accessions. 
Second, previous accessions allowed for a larger 
menu of options.  ERM membership was not required, 
EMU was not in existence.  Even if the transition 
economies elect to move slowly, an option discussed 
below, the fact that eventually they must first join the 
ERM, and then EMU, is an important constraint which 
affects both the behaviour of forward-looking financial 
markets and the authorities.  Finally, at the time of 
previous accessions, capital controls were not actively 
disallowed.  Greece, Portugal and Spain all made 
extensive use of this possibility.  (Whether it helped to 
stabilize their exchange markets remains another, and 
controversial, issue, however.) 
A number of policy implications emerge from the 
analysis of this paper.  A sizeable real appreciation will 
characterize the transition countries for a long time to 
come, and most likely for long after they have joined 
EMU.  This means either a trend appreciation of their 
nominal exchange rates with inflation at the EMU 
average, or an inflation rate in excess of the EMU 
average if the exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro is kept 
constant, and even more inflation if the nominal 
exchange rate is allowed to depreciate..  The estimates in 
table 7 allow a “guesstimate” of the size of this effect.  
Assuming a continuation of the average rates of growth 
of trend productivity in both sectors over the last five 
years for the countries displayed in chart 3 (8.6 per cent a 
year for industry and 1.9 per cent for services) and 
ignoring the per capita GDP term which reinforces the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect, the implied average annual 
rate of real appreciation lies between 2.9 and 3.1 per cent 
– say 3 per cent.
18 
During the two-year ERM membership period, 
which is required prior to EMU entry, there will be a 
trade-off between exchange rate stability and the inflation 
target.  Keeping the nominal exchange rate stable, as 
required for accession to EMU, could lead to an inflation 
rate 3 percentage points  above that in the euro area.   
Preventing such an inflation rate, which is also required 
for entry into the monetary union, will require the 
nominal exchange rate to appreciate each year by 3 
percentage points.  Over two years, this would represent 
about half of the ERM-2 bandwidth. 
This may seem comfortable but it is not.  Indeed, 
the tendency for real appreciation could be reinforced by 
capital inflows.  In fact, the inflows will affect the real 
exchange rate both via the nominal rate and via the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect as foreign investment has been 
found to significantly raise productivity growth more in 
industry, and less in the services sector.  Such an outcome 
could absorb the remaining half of the bandwidth.  The 
risk of currency crises in the acceding countries is 
therefore far from negligible. 
                                                        
18  It is assumed that there is no real appreciation elsewhere; 
otherwise these results would be modified. 